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
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	representative religious leaders, members of private industry and tribesmen. Among other things, the Council will be charged with forming a commission to draft a new constitution—the latest in a series of moves designed to improve the regime's domestic and international standing.	25.74
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-	25 towed 240-mm mortars, 36 82-mm Vasilek mortars, and at least 15 possible self-propelled 152-mm guns 285 at Towraghondi transshipment point. The Soviets will be markedly increasing their available firepower in western Afghanistan when this artillery is deployed. Additionally, the Soviets may send in additional troops to man the	25X1
	artillery.	25X1

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